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A TUNE-UP ON THE ENGINE OF FREE
EXPRESSION:
THE TRADITIONAL CONTOURS OF
COPYRIGHT IN GOLAN
I. INTRODUCTION
This note examines a recent Tenth Circuit decision, Golan v.
Gonzales, which found that'a federal statute altered the "traditional
contours of copyright law" and remanded the case to the district
court for a First Amendment analysis.1  Golan constructed a
workable test for determining whether a piece of legislation
violates the traditional contours of copyright law, and the Tenth
Circuit correctly applied the test. On remand, the district court
should hold that § 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
("URAA") does not pass the heightened scrutiny of even content-
neutral legislation, because Congress can more narrowly tailor the
law to fit its important interest. Congress can do this by
implementing a system similar to that in the United Kingdom,
where the owner of the copyright of the restored work may
negotiate to compensate a party who relied upon the work's
presence in the public domain.2
Part II examines Eldred v. Ashcroft, the most recent Supreme
Court attempt to refine the balance between the Copyright Clause
and the First Amendment, and the Court's "traditional contours"
test.' Additionally, Part II investigates the application of the
traditional contours test in the federal court system between the
Eldred decision and the Golan decision. Part III considers the
circumstances surrounding Golan and delineates the decision
1. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
2. Id. at 1196 n.5.
3. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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itself. Finally, Part IV analyzes the Golan decision and compares
it with Eldred and the prior applications in other Circuits, as well
as the potential outcome upon remand to the district court.
II. ELDRED V. ASHCROFT AND THE TRADITIONAL CONTOURS PRIOR
TO GOLAN
A. Background
Prior to 1998, there was a copyright term of either fifty years
plus life in the United States, or the earlier of seventy-five years
from publication or one-hundred years from creation if the author
was unknown.4 In 1998, Congress passed the Copyright Term
Extension Act ("CTEA"), which awarded copyright owners an
additional twenty years of copyright protection.' The CTEA was
passed in response to the European Union Term of Protection
Directive, which extended the European Union's copyright policy
by twenty years from life plus fifty years to life plus seventy
years.' The original plaintiff in the case, Eric Eldred, was the
proprietor of the unincorporated Eldritch Press, a website that
republished the works of others that are in the public domain.' For
instance, on the website, one can find works of Hawthorne,
Chekhov, Henry James, and the English translations of works that
may not otherwise be readily available to members of the public.'
The First Amendment protected this activity; Eldred disseminated
speech so that the public could have access to it.9
The CTEA affected Eldred by not allowing protected works that
were set to expire to enter the public domain, thereby not
4. Sue Ann Mota, "For Limited Times ": The Supreme Court Finds the
Copyright Term Extension Act Constitutional in Eldred v. Ashcroft, but When
Does It End?, 2005 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 4 (2005).
5. Copyright Term Extension Act § 102(b), (d), (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302,
304(b) (2006)).
6. Hugh Hansen, Panel II: Mickey Mice? Potential Ramifications of Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771, 773 (2003).
7. Id. at 793.
8. Eldritch Press, http://www.eldritchpress.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
9. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT§ 19E.05 [C] [1] (2007) [hereinafter NIMMER].
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expanding the public domain, which was the "oxygen" for
Eldred's website. ° Other plaintiffs were similarly situated in the
limitation of the movies they could release and the out-of-print
music and books they could reprint. "
B. The Decision
In a 7-2 majority opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the
Supreme Court in Eldred held that Congress did not overstep its
constitutional limitations by extending copyright protection an
additional twenty years to existing copyrights and future
copyrights. 2 The petitioners argued that the CTEA violated the
Copyright Clause 3 and the First Amendment of the Constitution
by applying its terms to existing copyrights. 4 The petitioners
contended that the CTEA was a content-neutral regulation of
speech and therefore warranted the heightened scrutiny demanded
by First Amendment jurisprudence. 5
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, from
which this case was appealed, ruled that "copyrights are
categorically immune from challenges under the First
Amendment."' 6 In responding to this absolute statement, Justice
Ginsburg first acknowledged that the copyright scheme employed
its own safeguards to protect speech.' 7 Namely, the purpose of the
copyright system is to be the engine which powers free expression,
and there are built-in accommodations embodied in the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense.18
Secondly, Justice Ginsburg determined that the CTEA
supplemented the above safeguards by supplying additional
protection. 9 The CTEA accomplished this by allowing libraries
and similar institutions to reproduce, distribute, display, or perform
10. Id.
11. Hansen, supra note 6, at 793.
12. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Eldred, at 193.
15. Id. at218.
16. Id. at 221 (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
17. Id. at 219.
18. Id. at 219.
19. Id. at 220.
2007]
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certain published works in the last twenty years of a term of
copyright.2" In addition, it exempted small businesses and
restaurants from having to pay royalties for broadcasting licensed
broadcasts in the course of their business.21
Finally, Justice Ginsburg differentiated the case from previous
First Amendment jurisprudence22 by stating that "[t]he First
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make - or decline to
make - one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers
assert the right to make other people's speeches."23 The majority
in Eldred summarized by holding that for First Amendment
scrutiny to be necessary, Congress would have to alter "the
traditional contours of copyright protection."24 Interestingly, the
traditional contours of copyright protection had not been
mentioned in any court prior to this decision, and Justice Ginsburg
offered no guidance to future courts as to how the term should be
construed. 5 In conclusion, Eldred backed off the D.C. Circuit's
explicit denial of First Amendment adjudication in the copyright
scheme and kept the challenge available for future litigants, though
this particular challenge failed.26
C. Application by Other Courts
1. Kahle v. Gonzales
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the only
other circuit court that had addressed the traditional contours of
copyright law prior to Golan. The plaintiffs in Kahle v. Gonzales
sought to obtain First Amendment review of the change from an
"opt-in" to an "opt-out" copyright system. 7 There, the plaintiffs
provided free digital access to "orphan works": those works that
20. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2006)).
21. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)).
22. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
23. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
24. Id.
25. NIMMER, supra note 9, §19E.05[C][2].
26. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
27. Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 698 (9th .Cir. 2007).
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either had little or no commercial value, but remained under
copyright protection. 28
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs claim pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim; it felt that the plaintiffs did not "provide a legal argument
explaining why [it] should ignore the clear holding of Eldred."29
The Kahle plaintiffs challenged the 1976 Copyright Act and the
CTEA under the new traditional contours test established in
Eldred, but the court felt that, despite the framing of the argument,
there was not a significant difference between the arguments.30
The plaintiffs were, in effect, challenging the extension of
copyrights." This had already been directly addressed in Eldred,
and thus, the plaintiffs were precluded from bringing the claim.3"
2. Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft
Finally, Luck's Music Library is the only United States district
court case that has addressed the traditional contours test of Eldred
without an appeal heard on that issue in a United States court of
appeals.33 There, the District Court for the District of Columbia
was presented with the same issue as that in Golan: whether § 514
of the URAA altered the traditional contours of copyright law and,
thus, warranted First Amendment scrutiny.34 However, the district
court made an interesting determination of what the traditional
contours of copyright law were. It determined that the traditional
contours were the built-in First Amendment safeguards of the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair-use doctrine.35 This is
somewhat illogical, and it makes the traditional contours language
redundant. The only way to alter the idea/expression dichotomy is
to make facts copyrightable, which would clearly upset "the
28. Id. at 698-99.
29. Id. at 699.
30. Id. at 700.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C.
2004), aff'd sub nom., Luck's Music Library v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (affirming without confronting the "traditional contours" issue).
34. Id. at 119.
35. Id.
2007]
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definitional balance between the First Amendment and the
Copyright Act."36  Therefore, the traditional contours must
encompass something more than the First Amendment safeguards.
III. GOLAN V. GONZALES
A. Background
The URAA is a multinational agreement that was negotiated
over several years. Section 514 of the URAA implemented the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPs").37  "TRIPs brings together under a single
umbrella agreement a broad range of intellectual property rights
previously protected by subject-specific agreements such as the
Beme, Paris and Rome Conventions."38 These conventions
emphasized "national treatment," which required signatory
countries to afford foreign authors the same copyright protection
that is afforded their own authors.39  TRIPs utilized the
conventions to dictate a baseline level by which signatory
countries must abide, in order to make it meaningful.4" By
agreeing to this structure, member nations secured international
copyright protection for their citizens.
As a signatory country, the United States was obligated to
conform its copyright law to the baseline set by the Beme
Convention if it wanted American authors to benefit economically
from the international dissemination of their works. Specifically,
Congress bestowed copyright protection upon foreign restored
works that were in the public domain in the United States. A
restored work is an original work in the following circumstance:
36. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985).
37. Caroline T. Nguyen, Expansive Copyright Protection for All Time?
Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty Power, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1079, 1091 (2006).
38. Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims under the TRIPs
Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 357, 358 (1998).
39. Nguyen, supra note 37, at 1092.
40. Id.
190
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(A) [The restored work] is protected under
subsection (a); 4'
(B) is not in the public domain in its source country
through expiration of term of protection; [and]
(C) is in the public domain in the United States due
to -
(i) noncompliance with formalities imposed
at any time by United States copyright law,
including failure of renewal, lack of proper
notice, or failure to comply with any
manufacturing requirements;
(ii) lack of subject matter protection in the
case of sound recordings fixed before
February 15, 1972; or
(iii) lack of national eligibility. 2
To enforce its newly restored copyright, the owner of the copyright
must provide notice to any person who, in relying on the work's
availability in the public domain, would have violated 17 U.S.C. §
106 if the restored work had been subject to copyright protection at
the time of the "violation."43 Upon receiving notice, the reliance
party has twelve months from the date it received the notice to
suspend its infringing activity.44
The plaintiffs are various parties whose livelihood relies on
works in the public domain. They are orchestra conductors,
educators, performers, film archivists, and motion picture
distributors.45 These plaintiffs have devoted their lives to the
pursuit and promotion of creative arts in this country. In their
artistic pursuits, they depend on the public domain as a vital source
of materials to teach, perform and disseminate to the public.
Lawrence Golan, for instance, is an educator at the University of
Denver. However, "because of copyright restoration in many
foreign works, there are many early 20th-Century works that are
41. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a) (2006).
42. Id. § 104A(h)(6)(A)-(C) (emphasis added).
43. Id. § 104A(d)(2)(B).
44. Id. § 104A(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
45. Appellants' Opening Brief at 12, Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th
Cir. 2007) (No. 05-1259), 2005 WL 2673976.
2007]
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part of a musician's standard repertoire that, depending on the
orchestra, [Golan] can no longer consider using because they are
no longer freely available in the public domain."46 The removal of
free access to materials in the public domain - and the
corresponding assurance that those materials will remain in the
public domain - severely hampered the plaintiffs' ability to pursue
their creative interests and promote learning in this country."
B. The Decision
The Tenth Circuit decision was argued before a three-judge
panel ("the Panel") consisting of Judges Henry, Briscoe, and
Lucero.48 In an opinion authored by Judge Henry, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held the following: (1) the claim
that the CTEA violated the Copyright Clause was properly
dismissed by the district court, because it is foreclosed by the
Supreme Court's decision in Eldred; (2) the URAA provision
restoring copyright protection to foreign works in the public
domain did not exceed the limitations of the Copyright Clause; and
(3) the URAA provision was subject to First Amendment scrutiny,
because it altered the traditional contours of copyright law.49
1. The CTEA Claim
First, the plaintiffs claimed that Congress violated the Copyright
Clause's "limited Times" provision when it enacted the CTEA's
twenty-year extension of existing copyrights." They attempted to
distinguish their claim from Eldred by directly challenging the
increase in copyright duration from life-plus-fifty-years to life-
plus-seventy-years; in Eldred, the petitioners challenged the
application of the CTEA on existing copyrights instead of only
future copyrights." Technically, the Court did not address this
46. Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
47. Id. at 6.
48. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007).
49. Id. at 1182.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1185.
8
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specific issue in Eldred. 2 Nevertheless, the Panel held that Eldred
foreclosed the petitioners' argument, reasoning that the rationale
underlying Eldred would dictate an identical analysis." Either
argument would require the Panel to depart from Eldred, "which
emphasized that our constitutional scheme charges Congress, and
not federal courts, with the task of defining the scope of the limited
monopoly that should be granted to authors."54  Therefore,
according to the Panel, the district court properly dismissed the
plaintiffs' challenge to the CTEA.55
2. The URAA Claim and the Copyright Clause
The plaintiffs next claimed that § 514 of the URAA violated the
Copyright Clause. 6  Similar to their CTEA challenge, the
plaintiffs contended that Congress circumvented the Copyright
Clause's "limited Times" provision. 7 According to the plaintiffs,
the URAA sapped the power of the "limited Times" provision by
granting copyright protection to works that have entered the public
domain, and approval of this legislation could allow Congress to
copyright works as they fell into the public domain, creating a
perpetual copyright. 8 However, similar to Eldred and the CTEA
claim in this case, the Panel recognized that a perpetual copyright
was not the issue before them. 9
In support, the plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court's
statement in Graham v. John Deere Co., that "Congress may not
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
access to materials already available," applied equally to
copyrights, since there is no meaningful distinction.6" The Panel,
however, did find meaningful distinctions between patents and
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Golan, 501 F.3dat 1185.
55. Id. at 1182.
56. Id. at 1185.
57. Id. at 1186.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209 (2003)).
60. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
6(1966)).
2007]
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copyrights in this context. First, the Panel adopted the D.C.
Circuit's "quid pro quo" reasoning in rejecting an identical
argument in Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales.61 In patents,
the issuance of a patent and its corresponding rights persuade the
patentee to disclose the knowledge in her work.62 Contrastingly, in
copyrights, an author is eager to disseminate her work without
encouragement; copyright protection is a motivation to create the
work.63 The court further distinguished copyrights from patents by
acknowledging the Court's observation in Eldred that the public
may not fully utilize the inventor's knowledge that is disclosed in a
patent, whereas a copyright does not award the author a monopoly
on her knowledge. 4
Since the Panel's analysis of Graham did not preclude Congress
from removing works from the public domain, the Panel
adjudicated the plaintiffs' claim under a rational-basis test.65 The
Copyright Clause gives Congress expansive powers. Thus, this
was an issue of scope, judgment, and policy best left to the elected
legislature so long as it rationally exercised its authority.66
Congress's rational basis was rooted in the decision to comply
with the Berne Convention, an international treaty, and to acquire
copyright protection for American works abroad.67 The Panel held
that this reasoning "is [not] so irrational or so unrelated to the aims
of the Copyright Clause that it exceeds the reach of congressional
power."6
3. The URAA Claim and the First Amendment
Lastly, since legislation enacted pursuant to the Copyright
Clause must still satisfy other express limitations of the
Constitution, the plaintiffs challenged the district court's ruling
that § 514 of the URAA was not subject to First Amendment
61. Id. at 1186-87 (citing Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d
1262, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
62. Id. at 1186.
63. See id. at 1186.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1187.
66. See Golan, 501 F.3d at 1187.
67. Id.
68. Id.
10
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review." The Panel analyzed the issue using several sub-issues:
(1) whether the URAA "altered the traditional contours of
copyright law";7" (2) whether the alteration of the traditional
contours of copyright law affected the plaintiffs' First Amendment
interests;7' (3) whether copyright's built-in free speech safeguards,
the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense,
sufficiently protected the plaintiffs' interests;72 and (4) whether the
URAA adequately supplements copyright's built-in free speech
safeguards.1
3
First, since the Eldred Court did not elaborate as to how a court
should determine whether Congress has altered a traditional
contour of copyright law, the Panel logically looked at the plain
language of the term.74 The Panel first identified that the "bedrock
principle" to be analyzed was that "works in the public domain
remain there."75 Then, the Tenth Circuit separated its analysis into
two components: the functional component of "contour" and the
historical component of "traditional."76
The functional component of the analysis led the Panel to
investigate the "general form or structure" of copyright protection,
including the copyright sequence and the way in which the public
domain delimited the scope of copyright protection. 77 The Panel
recognized that, despite numerous alterations to the specific
requirements for obtaining a copyright over the centuries, the
general sequence has remained the same: a work progressed from
creation, to copyright, to the public domain. Section 514 of the
URAA created a system in which, instead of ending in the public
domain, the process begins there. 79  Therefore, Congress has
69. Id. at 1187.
70. Id. at 1188-92.
71. Id. at 1192-94.
72. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1194-95.
73. Id. at 1195-96.
74. Id. at 1189 (the Panel used the dictionary definition of "contour," in
conjunction with the modifier "traditional," to look at the history of the ordinary
procedures of copyright law, and whether they had been altered).
75. Id. at 1187.
76. Id. at 1189.
77. Id.
78. Golan, 501 F.3dat 1189.
79. Id.
2007]
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altered this contour of copyright law.8" The Panel provided
numerous cases that stood for some variation of the principle that
once in the public domain, works are not copyrightable.8' These
factors demonstrated that, functionally, the contours of copyright
law include the principle that works in the public domain remain
there, and Congress altered these contours. 2
Next, the Panel addressed whether the historical component of
the test supported the plaintiffs' theory that works in the public
domain remain there, and whether § 514 of the URAA altered this
bedrock principle. 3  The Tenth Circuit examined two key
historical contexts: the Framers' views and Congressional practice
since the Framers. 4 The Panel concluded that constitutional
historians have not been provided with enough evidence to discern
the Framers' true views regarding copyright and the public
domain.5 Notably, "none of the usual, reliable sources - The
Federalist Papers, Madison's notes from the Constitutional
Convention, or accounts of the First Congress's deliberations -
took up the subject in any detail."86 The only evidence available to
interpret the Framers' intent is the 1790 Copyright Act,8 7 which
created federal copyright protection for books, maps, and charts
that were already printed.8 Nevertheless, the evidence did not
convince the Panel, because most of the works were not in the
public domain due to then-existing state copyright protection.89
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit decided that the evidence was "not
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1189-90 (citing Country Kids N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d
1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 1996); Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 470 (2d Cir.
1995); Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little, 71 F.3d 45, 48 (5th Cir.
1995); United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1978); M.M. Bus.
Forms Corp. v. Uarco, Inc., 472 F.2d 1137, 1140 (6th Cir. 1973); Amsterdam v.
Triangle Publ'ns, Inc., 189 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1951); Christianson v. West
Publ'g Co., 149 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945); Meade v. United States, 27 Fed.
Cl. 367, 372 (1992)).
82. Id. at 1189.
83. Id. at 1190.
84. Golan, 501 F.3dat 1190.
85. Id. at 1191.
86. Id. at 1190.
87. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15 § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
88. Golan, 501 F.3dat 1190.
89. Id. at 1191.
12
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just unclear but also unknowable," and therefore, it should not
support the conclusion that removal of works from the public
domain was an acceptable facet of the copyright scheme the
Framers created. 90
In viewing Congressional practice since the Framers, the
government conceded to the Panel that there have been few
instances of Congress removing works from the public domain.9"
Specifically, there were private bills and two wartime enactments:
an Act to Amend Sections 8 and 21 of the Copyright Act ("1919
Amendment")92 and the Emergency Copyright Act of 1941
("Emergency Act"). 93  Certainly, "the uncommon tactic of
petitioning Congress" for private bills did not support the
argument that removal of works from the public domain was
within Congress's normal practice. 94  Separately, the Panel felt
confident that world war was not a common enough occurrence to
make Congress's actions "traditional." 95 Combining the functional
and traditional components, the Panel held that § 514 of the
URAA "altered the traditional contours of copyright protection." '96
The second sub-issue the Panel faced was whether the alteration
of the traditional contours of copyright law affected the plaintiffs'
First Amendment interests. 97 By virtue of their availability in the
public domain, works belonged to the public, and each member of
the public owned non-exclusive rights to use those works.98
Among these non-exclusive rights is the right to create a derivative
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Act of Dec. 18, 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-102, 41 Stat. 368 (1919) (allowing
copyrights to be secured by a citizen or subject of a foreign nation so long as
"all works [were] ... first produced or published abroad after August 1, 1914,
and before the date of the President's proclamation of peace .... ").
93. Golan, at 1191 (citing Emergency Copyright Act of 1941, Pub. L. No.
77-258, 55 Stat. 732 (1941) (granting the President the power to grant an
extension of time to foreign authors whom "may have been temporarily unable
to comply with the conditions and formalities prescribed ... by the copyright
laws of the United States, because of the disruption or suspension of facilities
essential for such compliance")).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1192.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1193.
20071
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work. 99 One of the plaintiffs, John Blackburn, created such a
derivative work from a foreign work once in the public domain,
investing his resources in doing so.' 0 The lack of copyright
protection because of its availability in the public domain allowed
the plaintiff to create the work, while the First Amendment
protected his right to perform it.'0 ' In Eldred, Justice Ginsburg
stated that "[t]he First Amendment securely protects the freedom
to make - or decline to make - one's own speech; it bears less
heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's
speeches."'0 ' The Panel in Golan remarked that once in the public
domain, a work is everyone's speech to use.0 3 This distinguished
the plaintiffs in Golan from the plaintiffs in Eldred; the plaintiffs
in Eldred "did not - nor had they ever - possessed unfettered
access to any of the works at issue there."'0 4  Therefore, the
plaintiffs had vested First Amendment interests in the expressions
that were affected by Congress's alteration of the traditional
contours of copyright law. '05
Next, the Panel adjudicated the third sub-issue: whether
copyright's built-in free speech safeguards, the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use defense, sufficiently protected the
plaintiffs' interests.0 6 The idea/expression dichotomy safeguard
was designed to ensure that facts or ideas were available to the
public to use as desired, and expressions that bore a "stamp of the
author's originality" were the only facets of a work that were
copyrightable.0 7 In Eldred, the Supreme Court wrote that this
dichotomy "strikes a definitional balance between the First
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free
communication of facts while still protecting an author's
expression."'0 8 In Golan, it was obvious that the idea/expression
99. See Golan, 501 F.3d at 1193.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003).
103. Golan, 501 F.3dat 1193.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1194.
106. Id.
107. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 547 (1985)).
108. Id. (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003)).
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dichotomy did not adequately protect the plaintiffs' First
Amendment interests because the expressions themselves were not
the issue; the removal of the expressions from the public domain
was the controversy."0 9 The Panel concluded that the dichotomy
was not designed with this controversy in mind. 0
The second of copyright's built-in free speech safeguards is the
fair use defense."' The fair use defense allows people to use
copyrighted works to parody a work, to report the news, or to use a
quote in an academic paper similar to this one."12 However, the
Panel acknowledged that at no point in the fair use defense does it
address works that have previously been available for unrestricted
use through their entrance into the public domain." '" Section 514
of the URAA allows some access to the works via the fair use
defense, but less access than would be available if the works were
within the public domain. "' Consequently, the Panel ruled that the
fair use defense did not adequately protect the plaintiffs' First
Amendment interests.' 15
The final sub-issue that the Panel examined was whether the
URAA provided additional First Amendment safeguards." 6 The
Supreme Court in Eldred noted that the CTEA supplemented the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense with its
109. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1194.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1195; see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) ("[T]he fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.").
112. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)
(holding that a rap group's use of copyrighted material was fair use because
"parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use status . . .");
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(holding that a newspaper may use copyrighted works of the Church of
Scientology in its news report even if the copyrighted works are unpublished);
Craft v. Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that "the verbatim
quotation of a 45-word sentence lifted out of context from a full-length book for
these purposes is entitled ... to be considered fair use").
113. Golan, 501 F.3dat 1195.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
2007]
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exception for libraries and similar institutions, and for its
exemption allowing small businesses to play licensed radio
without paying performance royalties.' 7 In Golan, the Panel
failed to find any supplemental safeguards that would adequately
protect the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests. 118 The only "safe
harbor" the URAA allows is the right of "a party to use a restored
work for one year after receiving notice of the restored copyright
protection.""' 9  This safe harbor pales in comparison to the
protection offered by the CTEA, where additional safeguards do
not mandate a deadline by which parties must abstain from using
the copyrighted works.
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit ordered the case remanded to
the district court for a First Amendment analysis, since the
traditional contours of copyright law have been altered, and
because the safeguards that ordinarily protect First Amendment
interests are inadequate when adjudicating § 514 of the URAA.' °
On remand, the district court is to determine whether the statute is
content-based or content-neutral and apply the appropriate scrutiny
as dictated by the Supreme Court's prior jurisprudence.' 2
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Copyright Clause
The Panel in Golan rejected the appellants' argument that § 514
of the URAA violated the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.'22
The appellants founded their argument on the language of the
Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.'23 In Graham, a
patent case, the Court stated that "Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to
117. Id. at 1195-96 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003)).
118. Id. at 1196.
119. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2) (2006)).
120. Id. at 1196.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1187.
123. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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materials already available."'124  The appellants sought to extend
the application of this statement from patents to copyrights, since
there is "no meaningful distinction between copyrights and patents
that would prevent this court from applying Graham .... .""5
In rejecting the appellants' argument, the Panel relied heavily on
Eldred.126 There, Justice Ginsburg made two distinctions between
patents and copyrights: the different exchanges in the respective
'quid pro quo' arrangements with Congress and the grant of a
monopoly on knowledge to the patent holder to which the
copyright holder is not privy.'27 The question is, are these
distinctions meaningful enough to justify not extending the
prohibition on removing works from the public domain from
patents to copyrights?
First, one must address the validity of the distinctions. Congress
developed a patent structure which encourages inventors to
disclose their knowledge against their interest. 128  In contrast,
authors of copyrightable works are generally anxious to share their
knowledge with the public. 129 Thus, the disclosure of the creator's
knowledge is more contrary to the patentee's natural instincts than
to the copyright author's. This 'quid pro quo' distinction between
patents and copyrights is, therefore, not an adequate reason to
explain why the Graham Court's mandate may not be extended to
copyrights. If a patentee is relinquishing more, then why is the
Court willing to grant greater protection to copyrights by allowing
their removal from the public domain, while Graham mandates
that patents may not be removed from the public domain? If
anything, this distinction should encourage the Court to afford
patents greater protection.
Perhaps solace can be found in the second distinction: the
difference between the monopolies granted to patentees and those
granted to authors of copyrightable works. Here, patents are
124. Id. at 6.
125. Golan, at 1186 (emphasis added).
126. See id. at 1186-87 (citing Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003)).
127. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 216-17.
128. See id. at 190 ("[I]mmediate disclosure is not the objective of, but is
exacted from, the patentee.").
129. See id. ("[D]isclosure is the desired objective of the author seeking
copyright protection.").
2007]
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afforded more protection, since their limited monopoly prevents
the public from utilizing the knowledge disclosed.13 In contrast,
the public is able to employ knowledge gained from copyrighted
works since facts are not copyrightable.' 3 ' This distinction, taken
alone, suggests that since patents are given a greater reward for
their disclosure, they do not warrant protection as great as that of
copyrights. Therefore, this may be a reasonable argument for
allowing the copyright of some works in the public domain while
prohibiting the same practice for patents. Taking both distinctions
together, the greater monopoly that patentees receive neutralizes
the greater detriment they incur in disseminating knowledge they
would prefer to keep to themselves, and we are essentially back to
square one.
Second, one must address the context in which the distinctions
were made. Edward Walterscheid, a legal historian specializing in
intellectual property law, believes that the Eldred Court, from
which Golan got its authority, took inconsistent positions
regarding Graham: "Justice Ginsburg characterizes Justice
Stevens' reliance on certain language in Graham as based on
'[n]othing but wishful thinking' because '[t]he controversy in
Graham involved no patent extension.' What makes this
extraordinary is that she then proceeds to cite to Graham three
separate times in her own majority opinion." '32 The first citation,
"[the Supreme Court has] described the Copyright Clause as both a
grant of power and a limitation," encompasses the Copyright
Clause as a whole.'33  Justice Ginsburg does not have any
reservations about applying concepts broadly to both patents and
copyrights in her discussion of the scope of the Copyright Clause.
Likely, this is because Graham did not qualify its statement by
only mentioning patents; instead, it specifically refers to the entire
Copyright Clause.
130. Id.
131. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991)
("That there can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood.").
132. Edward C. Walterscheid, Musings on the Copyright Power: A Critique
of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 309, 340 (2004) (alterations in
original).
133. Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)).
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Next, the Court cited Graham to support the proposition that
Congress's interpretations of Article I powers, including the
Copyright Clause, are accorded great judicial deference.' 34 As in
the first citation, the Graham Court specifically used the term
"Article I" instead of explicitly limiting its statement merely to
patents. Justice Ginsburg's final citation of Graham is similar to
the second citation, in that it speaks to the deference that the
Constitution gives to Congress's judgment to determine the
intellectual property regimes.'35 The sentence after the one which
is quoted in Eldred specified that the deference to Congress in
intellectual property regimes "is but a corollary to the grant of
Congress of any Article Ipower."'36
In sum, Justice Ginsburg's citations to Graham to support her
argument are justified because the original text from which they
are taken does not separate patents from copyrights, in contrast to
the language the appellants wanted to extend to the copyright
scheme. In parts of the opinion, the Graham Court broadly
applied statements to either the Copyright Clause or Article I; it is
meaningful that Graham specified that only patents should not be
removed from the public domain.
Most detrimental to the credibility of Justice Ginsburg's
argument is that she used a patent case as controlling precedent for
the legislative expansion of existing copyrights. ' In McClurg v.
Kingsland, the Supreme Court ruled that an exemption which
mitigated a technicality in the patent application process may be
applied retroactively to an invention that had been unprotected for
two years.'38 The Court in McClurg said that there was not a
sound objection to the law as applied retroactively.' 3 Justice
Ginsburg opined that, "[n]either is it a sound objection to the
validity of a copyright term extension, enacted pursuant to the
134. Id. at 218 ("[JWudicial deference to such congressional definition is but a
corollary to the grant to Congress of any Article I power." (quoting Graham,
383 U.S. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted))).
135. Id. at 222 ("Congress may implement the stated purpose of the Framers
by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional
aim" (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted))).
136. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added).
137. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 203; see also Walterscheid, supra note 132, at 340.
138. Id. (citing McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843)).
139. McClurg, 42 U.S. at 206.
2007]
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same constitutional grant of authority, that the enlarged term
covers existing copyrights." 141 Since this application is only
relevant to the CTEA, it is not as damaging to the Golan court.
However, it significantly reduces the effectiveness of Justice
Ginsburg's argument in its entirety, the bulk of which Golan does
rely upon.
In conclusion, because of stare decisis, the Panel in Golan was
required to follow the Supreme Court's attenuated reconciliation
of its conclusion in Eldred with its statement in Graham. The
outcome regarding the Copyright Clause in Golan was correct.
Even if Congress makes poor choices that academia does not
necessarily agree with, Congress is still allowed to be wrong so
long as it acts within the scope of its Article I powers. The route
by which Eldred, and therefore Golan, came to this conclusion,
however, is languorous.
B. The First Amendment
1. The Traditional Contours
In its relatively short treatment of the First Amendment, the
Eldred Court created a new doctrine by which future copyright
litigation must adhere in order to warrant First Amendment
review: the traditional contours of copyright law must be altered.14'
The Court, however, neglected to outline a process for evaluating
what constitutes a traditional contour, leaving it to the lower courts
to develop a working doctrine. Therefore, since the term is
ambiguous, the Panel in Golan needed to revert to traditional
methods for construction of ambiguous terms.
To comprehend an ambiguous term, one must evaluate the plain
language of the term.'42  The Panel adequately did this by
separating "traditional contours" into "traditional" and
140. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 203-04.
141. Id. at 221.
142. See U.S. v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 96 (1820) ("The case must be a
strong one indeed, which would justify a Court in departing from the plain
meaning of words . . . in search of an intention which the words themselves did
not suggest.").
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"contours."' 43  The Tenth Circuit then logically identified the
traditional component as requiring an appraisal of the historical
component of the principle in question.'" Similarly, the Panel
used the dictionary definition of contour to show that a functional
component was required, appraising the outline or general
structure of something.'45 The phrase in totality then required that
the Panel determine whether the "remov[al] [of] a work from the
public domain alters the ordinary procedure of copyright
protection," with the historical practice of Congress regarding
copyright informing their decision.'46 The reasons supporting each
step of the development of this doctrine are clear and should not
elicit much argument from detractors.
With the Panel's satisfactory development of the traditional
contours test, the next concern was the application of the test. The
Panel determined that the general structure of copyright included
the sequence in which copyrights processed.'47 Copyrightable
works have always progressed in the same sequence under § 514:
"[a] work progressed from (1) creation; (2) to copyright; (3) to the
public domain."' 48 The application of § 514 of the URAA requires
that this sequence be altered. The Panel concluded that it now
starts with the public domain; the more reasonable argument is that
it still starts with creation and then proceeds to the public domain
before copyright. Regardless of the particular sequence, it is
enough to say that the contour has been altered by Congress.
Next, to employ the "traditional" modifier, the alteration of this
contour should be viewed in light of the Framers' intent as well as
the historical practices of the judiciary and of Congress. 14' First,
the Tenth Circuit offered a plethora of cases to support its
conclusion "that ordinarily works in the public domain stay
there."'50  The Panel failed to list a single instance of a court
allowing copyright protection to something in the public domain.
143. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2007).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1190.
150. Id. at 1189-90.
2007] 205
21
Glaser: A Tune-Up on the Engine of Free Expression: The Traditional Conto
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol. XVIII:185
This is not because it was attempting to only support its
conclusion; there are no cases in which a work in the public
domain has been granted copyright protection. This weighs
heavily toward the conclusion that § 514 of the URAA is an
alteration of the traditional contours.
Next, since the government conceded that the removal of works
from the public domain has not been a common practice of
Congress, it will not warrant an extended discussion here.' 5'
Considering the 1919 Amendment and the Emergency Act both
occurred amidst world wars, the practices of Congress indicate that
the removal of works from the public domain should only occur
under extenuating circumstances. 152 The government did defend
its argument that private bills granted to individuals should
persuade the Panel to acknowledge that the historical component
of the traditional contours supports the government's position.
The Panel correctly dismissed this argument quickly by stating that
"[flar from providing evidence that copyrighting works in the
public domain is within the traditional contours of copyright
protection, the fact that individuals were forced to resort to the
uncommon tactic of petitioning Congress demonstrates that this
practice was outside the normal practice.,'153
Lastly, the Framers' views should also influence any
determination of the historical component of the traditional
contours test. The Panel labored through a discussion of the
possible intent of the Framers, only to conclude that the evidence
was inconclusive at best.' Though necessary for a thorough
analysis, the Tenth Circuit could have found that, even if the 1790
Copyright Act removed works from the public domain of the
States, it was enacted under extenuating circumstances, similar to
the wartime enactments. Hopefully, the founding of our Nation is
not a recurring activity.
2. The Safeguards
Although Eldred does not explicitly state that courts in
151. Id. at 1191.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1190-91.
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subsequent cases need to apply the idea/expression dichotomy and
the fair-use defense to the questioned legislation, it is intuitive.
There is no reason to involve a heightened-scrutiny First
Amendment adjudication if the freedom of expression is
adequately protected by these two safeguards. In this case, the
protection by the safeguards was clearly inadequate.'55
The moment a work is in the public domain, everyone has a
First Amendment interest at issue."' Anyone has the right to
express - or not to express - that work in any manner that they
desire.'57 This is a significant distinction from CTEA litigation
such as Eldred, in which members of the public did not yet have
any freedom of expression interests in the works; the CTEA
merely delayed when the plaintiffs would obtain those interests.
The idea/expression dichotomy and the fair-use exception would
adequately protect the plaintiffs' interests in Eldred because the
plaintiffs did not possess any interests greater than those in typical
copyright litigation.
In Golan, the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair-use
defense only protect specific subsets of works: factual information,
parodies, news reports, and academic uses.'58 If these safeguards
are applied to § 514 of the URAA, the legislation still encumbers
the plaintiffs' freedom of expression in a significant amount of
works - everything else. Regarding the idea/expression
dichotomy, the Panel correctly opined that "[t]he idea/expression
dichotomy is simply not designed to determine whether
Congress's grant of a limited monopoly over an expression in the
public domain runs afoul of the First Amendment."' 59 Similarly,
regarding fair use, the Panel had this to say:
[The fair use doctrine] does not address works that
have entered the public domain and are therefore
available for unrestricted use .... The fact that the
155. See Golan, 501 F.3d at 1195.
156. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23,
33-34 (2003) ("[O]nce the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public
may use the invention or work at will and without attribution.").
157. Id.
158. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107 (2006). This is not an exclusive list.
159. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1194.
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fair use doctrine permits some access to those
works may not be an adequate substitute for the
unlimited access enjoyed before the URAA was
enacted. 6 °
The Panel in Golan also sought to determine if the legislation
supplemented the traditional internal safeguards of the copyright
doctrine with additional safeguards comparable to those provided
by the CTEA.' 6' In Eldred, the Court acknowledged that the
CTEA complemented the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair
use doctrine with exceptions in certain circumstances for libraries
and small businesses. 62 Libraries were allowed to reproduce a
limited amount of copyrighted works "for the purposes of
preservation, scholarship, or research."' 63 Small businesses were
exempted from paying royalties on music played from licensed
radio."64 Neither of these exemptions came burdened with a time
restriction.
The URAA does supplement the traditional safeguards, but they
too are inadequate.' 65 First, if someone has infringed a restored
work in reliance on its availability in the public domain, and the
author of the restored work does not supply notice to the infringer
or the Copyright Office, then there is no infringement.'66 Second,
if notice is provided, the infringer may still use the restored work
for up to one year from the date of notice.'67 Lastly, if an author
has relied on the restored work in creating a derivative work, "[he]
may continue to exploit that derivative work for the duration of the
restored copyright if [he] pays to the owner of the restored
copyright reasonable compensation for conduct which would be
subject to a remedy for infringement but for the provisions of this
paragraph."' 68  While these safe harbors do supplement the
traditional safeguards, they do not protect people who have not yet
160. Id. at 1195.
161. Id.
162. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003).
163. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 108(h)).
164. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)).
165. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1195.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(2).
167. Id. § 104A(d)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
168. Id. § 104A(d)(3)(A)(ii).
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created derivative works, even though they possessed that First
Amendment right before the removal of the works in question.
Additionally, they only protect those people who have relied on
the restored works for one year. The supplements in the CTEA
contained no such time limits. There is enough to distinguish the
URAA's supplements from the CTEA's supplements to support
the Panel's conclusion that they are "hardly a guarantee of
breathing space." '169
In summation, the Tenth Circuit diligently developed and
applied a workable test for determining whether a piece of
legislation altered the traditional contours of copyright law. The
logic used to conclude that § 514 of the URAA did alter the
traditional contours is sound, as is the logic used to decide that the
internal safeguards that normally protect First Amendment
interests in copyright were inadequate. Therefore, the Panel
properly remanded the case to the district court for First
Amendment scrutiny.
C. Issues on Remand
On remand, the district court will need to resolve two issues.
First, it will need to analyze whether § 514 of the URAA is a
content-based or content-neutral restriction. 7 ' Second, the district
court will have to apply the appropriate test to conclude whether
the legislation violates the First Amendment and, thus, is
unconstitutional.'' If the district court finds that the law is
content-based, then "strict scrutiny" is the applicable test.'72
However, if the district court rules that the law is content-neutral,
then "intermediate scrutiny" is the appropriate test. 173
Determining whether a restriction is content-based or content-
169. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)
("[P]recedents ... apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its
content.").
173. Id. ("[R]egulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject
to an intermediate level of scrutiny .... ).
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neutral will often be evident on its face.174 "As a general rule, laws
that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored
speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content
based."' 75 Since the codification of § 514 of the URAA does not
discriminate speech based on the ideas or views expressed within,
the legislation is not content based. The law is content-neutral,
and the district court should apply intermediate scrutiny to it.
The standard for the intermediate scrutiny of content-neutral
regulation was set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Brien.'76 A content-neutral regulation is sustained under the
following conditions:
[I]t is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. "'
The removal of foreign works from the public domain is within
the constitutional power of the government; Golan confirmed that
the regulation is within Congress's Copyright Clause powers.178
The government will likely argue persuasively that its primary
interest is ensuring greater protection for American works abroad
and that the interest is substantial. It may also argue that
adherence to an international treaty is a substantial interest. The
purposes of these interests are not the suppression of free
expression any more than the purpose of the traditional copyright
doctrine is the suppression of free expression.
The final step in the analysis is determinative. The restriction of
the freedom of expression must be no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of ensuring greater protection for American works
174. Id.
175. Id. at 643.
176. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
177. Id. at 377.
178. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2007).
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abroad. The Tenth Circuit seemed to give some indication of its
desired result upon remand in a footnote at the end of the
opinion. 179 Though the issue was not broached in the main text of
the opinion, the Panel noted the less restrictive means by which
other countries have employed § 514 of the IRAA. 8o The United
Kingdom, among other nations, allows the reliance party "to
continue making those uses of the work it had made, or incurred
commitments to make, before its copyright is restored. But the
reliance party can be bought out by the owner of the restored
copyright."'' The buy-out price may either be negotiated or
decided in arbitration.' This system would still maintain the
interests of Congress by giving effect to the various treaties
involved and affording American works increased copyright
protection overseas. At the same time, it would reduce the
incidental restriction on the First Amendment interests. The key is
the offer of arbitration. This way, the foreign author does not have
to compensate a reliance party who merely performed the work as
much as a reliance party who committed significant resources to
creating a derivative of the foreign author's work. It also makes
more sense for the owner of the restored work to compensate the
author of a derivative work, instead of vice versa, because the
owner of the restored work is the one who made the mistake of not
obtaining a copyright originally due to technicalities; the author of
the derivative work was well within his rights to create the
derivative work when it was created. This does not have to be the
exact system that Congress employs, since it is not for the
judiciary to legislate, but intermediate scrutiny authorizes the
judiciary to declare what may not be permitted.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Congress set a dangerous precedent by
passing legislation that removed works of foreign authors from the
179. Id. at 1196 n.5.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citing Irwin Karp, Final Report, Berne Article 18 Study on
Retroactive United States Copyright Protection for Berne and Other Works, 20
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 157, 178 (1996)).
182. Id.
2007]
27
Glaser: A Tune-Up on the Engine of Free Expression: The Traditional Conto
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IPLAW [Vol. XVIII:185
public domain at the expense of the First Amendment interests of
the public. This legislation is a critical step in securing broader
copyright protection for American authors abroad, an important
interest. However, the freedom of expression guaranteed by the
First Amendment, one of the most fundamental rights possessed
by our citizenry, should supersede this important interest. The
Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Eldred Court's "traditional
contours" language allowed the judiciary to apply proper First
Amendment scrutiny to this critical issue.
The Panel in Golan constructed a test that can be simply
understood by lawmakers and simply applied by the federal court
system on a case-by-case basis. First, the court must determine
what is at issue in the case. Then the court must construct a
structure by which copyright normally operates, with the historical
practices of Congress, the historical practices of the courts, and the
Framers' intent shaping the structure. After that, the court should
recognize exactly what First Amendment issues are implicated in
the legislation. Next, the court should determine whether
copyright's internal safeguards, the idea/expression dichotomy and
the fair use defense, adequately protect the First Amendment
interests at stake. Finally, the court should weigh any
supplemental First Amendment protections that the legislation may
afford the interested parties. If a court follows this outline, it
should successfully weed out frivolous challenges to the copyright
system, and allow the courts to expend resources upon First
Amendment issues that are worthy of them.
Keith Glaser
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